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Understanding the “Trinamic”:  
A Net Assessment of ISIS
Heather S. Gregg
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California1
Abstract: Violent non-state actors are of particular security concern today and 
will continue to be for the foreseeable future. This article uses a net assessment 
approach to analyze the threat posed by religiously motivated, violent non-state 
actors and how governments can better understand these threats, their popular 
support, and how to minimize their effects. It proposes that the goal of govern-
ments should be to “win” critical populations away from non-state actors that 
require their support to survive. Using ISIS as an example, the article demon-
strates that a purely enemy-centric approach to countering violent non-state 
actors that use religion is likely to alienate critical populations whose support 
is necessary to defeating these threats.
Keywords: ISIS, Islamic State, religious extremism, terrorism, net assessment
Non-state actors—individuals and groups not directly controlled by a government that seek to challenge the social or political status quo—
have been a significant source of threat to governments in the twenty-first 
century. Violent non-state actors that use religious themes and resources 
to gain support and motivate behavior are of particular security concern 
to governments and will continue to be in the foreseeable future. Despite 
this, academic and policy circles have struggled with how to understand the 
problem of religiously motivated violent non-state actors and which actions 
to take to blunt their growth.
1Heather S. Gregg is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis Department at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, where she works primarily with U.S. and international 
special operations forces.
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This article uses a net assessment approach to analyze the threat posed by 
religiously motivated violent non-state actors and how governments can better 
understand these threats, their popular support, and how to minimize their 
effects. The article begins by providing a brief overview of the net assessment 
process and how it can be applied to analyzing the dynamic between non-state 
actors, populations that directly and indirectly support these groups, and gov-
ernment actions aimed at undermining non-state actors, what the article calls 
the “trinamic.” It also includes a brief discussion on the particular resources 
religion brings to non-state actors. It then provides a brief net assessment of 
ISIS to demonstrate the “trinamic.”
Ultimately, non-state actors need a degree of active and passive support 
from critical populations to survive and carry out their objectives over the 
long haul; therefore, the goal of government actions should be to drive a wedge 
between non-state actors and populations that directly and indirectly support 
them. A purely enemy-centric approach to countering violent non-state actors 
can be counterproductive to these aims.
What Is Net Assessment?
A net assessment approach to addressing security focuses not only on a spe-
cific adversary and its intents and capabilities, but also considers one’s own 
capabilities and goals. In other words, a net assessment approach focuses on 
more than just threats and is not just enemy-centric. Yee-Kuan Heng describes 
net assessment by summarizing: “simply put, net assessment incorporates the 
Sun Tzu adage of war: know the enemy and know yourself . . . net assessment 
studies the dynamics of interaction, and characteristics of two sides engaged 
in competitive situations, such as war.”2 Paul Bracken contends: “The best way 
to define net assessment is to understand that it is a practice. It isn’t an art 
(like military judgment), nor is it a science (like chemistry). Rather, it’s a way 
of tackling problems from certain distinctive perspectives that involve skills 
that can be improved. . . . By knowing the perspectives of net assessment, and 
sharpening the skills associated with each of them, one will be able to apply 
net assessment and also be able to speak an important language.”3
Several types of net assessment address specific aspects of the dynamic 
interaction between competitors or adversaries. One form of net assessment 
focuses specifically on military strength, and aims to predict outcomes of 
force-on-force engagements with a country’s adversaries. This form of net 
assessment includes mathematical modeling of weapons systems and their 
2Heng 2007, 424.
3Bracken 2006. 
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capabilities, iterative game theory, table-top exercises, and other simulations 
designed to estimate one’s military strength relative to a specific adversary.4
Heng notes that another form of net assessment “attempts to weigh relative 
military power of states in competitive situations.”5 This form of net assessment 
goes beyond just military forces to include factors such as economic might 
and political will. This process involves gathering intelligence on the enemy’s 
capabilities and intentions and weighing these factors against one’s own 
readiness, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Citing Bracken, Heng summarizes: 
“The concept can thus refer to a judgement, or a reasonable summary of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both sides involved in strategic competitions as 
they evolve: ‘an overall ‘net’ assessment of a competitive situation’ is reached 
after analyzing and integrating various information sources in a centralized 
manner to produce joint-up thinking.”6
While scholars note that a net assessment approach to understanding 
competitors and adversaries is not new—one can see this assessment in the 
works of Sun Tsu, Clausewitz, and even France’s assessment of Nazi Germany 
leading up to World War II7—net assessment gained importance to better un-
derstand future threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Andy 
Marshall, then an analyst at the RAND Corporation, drafted a net assessment 
of Soviet and U.S. capabilities in 1972, with the broader goal of better under-
standing military, economic, and diplomatic policies aimed at mitigating this 
protracted threat.8 RAND’s net assessment called for an in-depth look at U.S. 
assumptions, policies and actions, not just the capabilities and intentions of the 
Soviet Union. Among other things, RAND’s net assessment of the competi-
tion between the Soviet Union and the United States stressed the importance 
of more precisely identifying areas of research and development that would 
give the United States an advantage over its adversary.9 Also during the Cold 
War, several political scientists offered net assessments of a conventional battle 
between NATO and Soviet forces in the Fulda Gap, including fire-power 
scores, the challenges of alliances and their effects on military readiness and 
action, and the role that various governments and political stability play on 
the military balance between the Soviet Union and NATO countries.10






10Cohen 1988; Mearsheimer, Posen, and Cohen 1989. 
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These types of net assessment focus specifically on competition between 
states and, while clearly this form of adversarial interaction still exists, a new 
strategic enemy has emerged—non-state actors. Scott Gartner notes, “Net 
Assessment ‘looks at the strategic match between the two sides’ strengths 
and weaknesses.’ Integrating highly disparate factors into a single calculation 
represents a considerable challenge . . . the question then is, how should we 
conduct net assessment of violent non-state actors in a way that addresses these 
inherent challenges?”11 Gartner further describes, “States have comparatively 
static boundaries, slowly changing populations, fixed resource endowments, 
predictable interests, and sluggishly adaptive institutions. By contrast, non-
state actors such as terrorist and insurgent groups rapidly emerge, change, 
and die, and have widely varying capabilities, interests and behaviors.”12 
Gartner’s observations of the relative advantages and disadvantages of state 
versus non-state actor competition underscores the complexity of creating a 
net assessment of the dynamic between these adversaries.
Adding to the complexity of providing a net assessment of non-state actors 
is the challenge posed by differing definitions of “victory” between states and 
non-state actors. Typically, states need to defeat threatening non-state actors, 
usually by rendering them irrelevant to sympathetic populations, in order to 
declare victory. By contrast, non-state actors need only to survive in order to 
declare themselves victorious, at least in the short run.
Furthermore, non-state actors need the active and passive support of criti-
cal populations—either coerced or through positive inducements—to protect 
themselves from government actions, to garner new recruits, and to acquire 
key resources. They also tend to grow and prosper better when sympathetic 
states provide sponsorship to them, as a 2001 RAND report illustrates.13 How-
ever, without the support of relevant populations, they will quickly whither 
on the vine. Ultimately, a net assessment of the dynamic between states and 
non-state actors needs to consider that relevant populations are their most 
important resource and may outweigh the need for territory, military equip-
ment, or even funding to survive. The key components of a net assessment 
between these groups are summarized in Table 1.
A net assessment involving non-state actors, therefore, requires a govern-
ment to know its own national and international goals, how to realize these 
goals, and its degree of support from critical populations. Governments must 
also know the non-state actor’s goals, its means for realizing these goals, its 
11Citing himself. Gartner 2015, 11.
12Gartner 2015, 12.
13Byman et al. 2001. 
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degree of support from critical populations, and how it achieved this support. 
And they need to understand the population’s grievances, values, and needs 
and vulnerabilities, including security and other services. This “trinamic” is 
unique from a net assessment of adversarial states in that critical populations 
become as important to assess as the adversary, if not more. The trinamic is 
depicted in Table 2.
Table 2: The Trinamic of Non-State Actor Net Assessment
The Government The Non-State Actor Critical Populations
• National security 
priorities and goals
• Capabilities for 
achieving goals
• Relationship with 
critical populations
• Its goals
• Its means for achieving 
goals
• Its degree of popular 
support and how it 
achieved this support
• Its grievances and 
vulnerabilities
• Its values
• Its source of security 
and other services
Ultimately, governments should aim to separate the support provided by 
critical populations from non-state actors that require the population’s active 
and passive support to survive. As will be described, governments that focus 
too heavily on using force to defeat non-state actors run the risk of alienating 
critical populations that support them. Similarly, non-state actors that focus 
too heavily on terrorism—targeting populations with the intent of gaining 
recognition or pressuring governments into overreacting—run the risk of los-
ing the support of critical populations that they need to survive. Ultimately, 
both groups should focus on “winning” the support of critical populations, 
as opposed to “defeating” the adversary.
Table 1: States vs. Non-State Actor Net Assessment
Assessment of States Assessment of Non-State Actors
Importance of territory Importance of passive and active support from 
populations
Understanding regime type Understanding organizational structure
Assessing government 
intentions
Assessing non-state actor ideology
Measuring military 
capabilities
Measuring financial resources/state support
Victory in war measured 
by defeat of adversary
Victory in war measured by not being defeated in short 
run, winning support of population in long run
Journal of Religion and Violence, Vol. 7, No. 1, 20198
Building on this discussion of net assessment, religiously motivated 
non-state actors—groups that draw on religious resources to develop their 
ideologies, build relationships with critical populations, and garner recruits 
and support—are a specific concern to countries around the globe. Religion is 
a powerful tool for them because it provides an array of readymade resources, 
including themes that can inform ideologies; networks that can be used to 
spread information and mobilize supporters; leaders (often charismatic) that 
have legitimacy with religious adherents; social services like charities, schools 
and hospitals; and even money and media outlets.14 Furthermore, those that 
use religious themes to explain and justify their actions potentially have the 
ear of the wider community of adherents, which can be a valuable pool from 
which to recruit and garner support. Religion’s unique contribution is that 
these resources are readymade and do not have to be built from scratch, 
which saves critical time and effort. Ultimately, non-state actors that base their 
narrative on religious themes, or include them within other frames, elevate 
conflicts in this world to ones in which divine themes of Good versus Evil, 
divine justice, and salvation are at stake.
As will be discussed, ISIS used a sophisticated mixture of religious themes 
and resources to forge the Islamic State, build a global network of likeminded 
groups, and inspire individuals to perpetrate terrorist acts in the West. While 
the Islamic State as an actual state is all but destroyed, ISIS still persists. There-
fore, it is critically important to conduct a net assessment of ISIS, including 
how it has built support around the globe, coalition powers’ response to this 
non-state actor, and critical populations it needs to survive.
Net Assessment of ISIS, the Counter-ISIS Coalition,  
and the Wider Muslim Population
The emergence of ISIS in 2011, its rapid expansion throughout Syria and Iraq, 
its creation of the caliphate and Islamic State, its support from likeminded non-
state actor groups around the globe, and the attraction of over 40,000 foreign 
fighters took countries around the globe by surprise.15 In 2014, a coalition of 
nearly eighty countries formed to address the problem, drawing primarily on 
military force to confront the Islamic State. This coalition succeeded in defeat-
ing it by 2019; however, despite its demise, ISIS as a non-state actor persists 
and continues to work with likeminded non-state actors on several continents. 
Furthermore, its ideology has inspired individuals with no direct ties to the 
group to carry out terrorist acts in the West. Therefore, a net assessment of 
14Gregg 2018; Gregg 2014. 
15Barrett 2017. 
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the group, government policies and actions aimed at undermining ISIS, and 
possible wider Muslim support for the group, are important for understand-
ing the persistence of this non-state actor. Each of these parts of the trinamic 
will be investigated below.
ISIS
ISIS emerged, in part, as a result of the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
unsuccessful efforts to install democracy in Iraq following the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003. It emerged from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), one of the country’s main insurgent groups during the U.S.-led oc-
cupation, and was aligned with Al Qaeda’s arm in Syria, the al Nusra Front, 
before a falling out with Al Qaeda leadership 2013.16 From 2013 to 2014, ISIS 
expanded rapidly in Syria, taking advantage of the civil war there to hold cit-
ies, to recruit and to carry out operations against other insurgent groups and 
the Syrian government. In June of 2014, ISIS rolled over Syria’s border with 
Iraq en masse, and with little effort took Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. On 
June 26, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, announced the creation of 
the caliphate with himself as the caliph.17
ISIS’s ideology draws on a mixture of themes from Islam, combined 
with various social and political grievances, to create an extreme and intol-
erant agenda. Specifically, it embraces a particular understanding of Sunni 
Islam known as Salafism. Salafis believe that the Qur’an and the example 
of the Prophet provide a complete guide for Islam today, and that all other 
contributions or interpretations, particularly human reason, are biddah, or 
innovation. Quintan Wictorowicz describes, “Salafis believe that by strictly 
following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna (path or example 
of the Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity 
and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s 
commands.” Wictorowicz goes on to explain, “From this perspective, there is 
only one legitimate religious interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist.”18
Furthermore, ISIS invokes the “Prophetic methodology,” which is the 
belief that following the Prophet’s example to the most precise detail will help 
purify and consolidate the worldwide Muslim community.19 All Muslims know 
the Prophet and revere his life. John Renard notes, “From a spiritual perspec-
tive, Muhammad functions as the progenitor par excellence, for God created 
16McCants 2015, 89–92. Williams 2017, 273–274.
17McCants 2015, 126–144; Wood 2016, 50–52; Kilcullen 2016, 85.
18Wictorowicz 2006, 207.
19Wood 2015. 
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him first of all creatures. Mystical poets call him the final cause of creation, 
the reason behind it all, quoting the sacred tradition, ‘But for you, I would 
have not created the universe.’”20 ISIS, in other words, is using a particular 
understanding of the Prophet’s actions and his life to explain its actions and 
goals to the wider Muslim community.
ISIS recreated the caliphate as a means of unifying and purifying the 
Muslim world through this understanding of Islam. Initially, the Muslim com-
munity was united under one leader, the Prophet Muhammed, followed by 
the first four leaders after his death, or caliphs. However, after Ali, the fourth 
Caliph, was murdered in 661, the community split between the majority, who 
recognized the Caliph, and those who followed leadership based on blood-
line to the Prophet Muhammed, a group that became Shias. ISIS claimed to 
recreate the caliphate as an attempt to reunify the community. Furthermore, 
only with a rightly guided leader are some aspects of sharia implementable. 
The recreation of the caliph, therefore, was also a means of implementing the 
most perfect form of shariah on earth.21
ISIS further made “purifying” the Ummah—the worldwide Muslim 
community—one of its goals. It targeted Shia Muslims, first and foremost, of 
which thousands were massacred in Iraq and Syria since its rise to power.22 
Sufis, the mystical tradition in Islam, have also been targeted. Finally, ISIS has 
killed fellow Sunnis who did not conform to their understanding of Salafism, 
including more secular minded Sunnis.23 Outside the faith, ISIS has targeted 
Christians, Yazidis, and any other religious group that stands in its way. Over-
all, ISIS has murdered an estimated 15,000 in Iraq and Syria, and 202 mass 
graves have been found as of October 2018.24
In addition to building on concepts of unity and purity, ISIS’s ideology also 
contains themes of apocalypticism. Wood and McCants, for example, argue 
that its grand strategy is actually driven by apocalyptic imagining; members 
draw from well-known themes of apocalypticism in Islam, including the epic 
battles between “Rome” and Islamic forces, the coming of the Mahdi, the re-
turn of Jesus, and the end of times.25 Furthermore, evidence suggests that its 
earthly salvific goals are actually a means for realizing the apocalypse. Wood, 
for example, argues that the recreation of the caliphate and the implementation 
20Renard 1999, 105.
21Esposito 2003, 49, 169; Wood 2015.
22Alaaldin 2017. 
23Williams 2017, 285–288; Haykel 2015, 21–26.
24UNAMI 2018.
25Wood 2015; McCants 2015.
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of complete and “perfect” shariah will actually create the conditions for the 
end of times.26 The realization of this earthly agenda has become the necessary 
condition for apocalyptic messianism.
ISIS has drawn on a complex mixture of religious and material resources 
to realize its extremist and apocalyptic goals. Perhaps ISIS’s most important 
resource is its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who has several important traits 
that are essential for affirming and executing its grand strategy. First, Baghdadi 
claims lineage to the Quraysh tribe and the Prophet Muhammed, which, ac-
cording to some interpretations, is necessary to become caliph and fulfills an 
important apocalyptic prophecy that twelve rightly guided caliphs will govern 
the ummah before the end of times.27 Second, unlike bin Laden, Baghdadi 
has formal religious education and holds a PhD in Qur’anic recitation from 
the University of Baghdad.28 Third, Baghdadi has experience as an insurgent. 
In 2004, U.S. forces apprehended him in Fallujah and he spent nearly a year 
in Bucca detention facility, where he made valuable contacts with elite forces 
that served Saddam Hussein. Following his release, he resumed insurgent 
activity and, in 2006, his group became part of AQI, the forerunner to ISIS.29 
He served in various jobs with the insurgency, including as part of the Shura 
council, before becoming emir in 2011.30
Until the Islamic State’s collapse, ISIS also had significant material re-
sources, particularly finances, at its disposal. It built a robust array of funding 
streams, including revenue from oil, kidnapping for ransom, black market 
antiquities sales, fake charities, theft and sponsorship from “angel donors,” 
wealthy individuals from the Arabian peninsula that support ISIS’s Salafi 
agenda. It also extracted taxes from the local populations in Iraq and Syria.31 
These financial assets were necessary for paying fighters and those that im-
migrated to Iraq and Syria. For example, ISIS initially paid fighters in Iraq 
and Syria between $400 to $600 U.S. dollars a month for their service before 
the Islamic State lost territory and revenue. ISIS also financially rewarded 
women who married its fighters and had children.32
ISIS also worked to build relationships with different critical populations 
that it needed for support and resources. First, the Islamic State provided 
26Wood 2015. 




31Giovanni, Goodman, and Sharkov 2014; BBC 2018. 
32Nicks 2016; Bloom 2015. 
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varying degrees of governance, including both coercion and resources, to the 
populations it controlled in Iraq and Syria. A 2014 report from the Institute for 
the Study of War, for example, notes that, “Through the integration of military 
and political campaigns, particularly in the provincial capital of Raqqa, ISIS 
has built a holistic system of governance that includes religious, educational, 
judicial, security, humanitarian, and infrastructure projects, among others.”33 
The report goes on to argue that, despite its holistic vision for governance and 
building relationships with the local population, governance would become its 
greatest weakness if the level of service it was providing was not sustained, a 
prediction that proved to be true.34 A RAND report that used satellite imagery 
to evaluate ISIS governance in Iraq and Syria came to a similar conclusion. 
By studying five cities under ISIS control, they noted that, in cities where 
ISIS had complete control, such as Raqqa and Mosul, electricity was restored 
and the cities appeared to be functioning under its governance. However, in 
militarily contested cities, specifically Ramadi, Tikrit, and Deir ez-Zor, basic 
governance was much more difficult to establish. These cities were some of 
the first to fall from ISIS control.35
ISIS also encouraged Muslims from all over the world to immigrate to 
the Islamic State, to join the caliphate and to fight on its behalf. As early as 
2011, foreign fighters began pouring into Syria from neighboring countries 
including Libya, Jordan, and Turkey. The Soufan Center, which tracks for-
eign fighters connected to ISIS, estimated that over 40,000 foreign fighters 
came to the Islamic State in all, and nearly 20,000 women and children came 
to support the effort.36 Beyond foreign fighters, numerous individuals have 
perpetrated terrorist actions on behalf of ISIS without any formal connection 
to the non-state actor, including Syed Rizwan Farooq and Tashfin Malik (2015 
San Bernadino killing of 14); Omar Mateen (2016 Pulse Nightclub shooter 
of 49); and Mohamed Salmene Lahouaiej-Bouhlel (2016 Bastille day killer of 
86).37 These individuals received inspiration but no formal training from ISIS.
Finally, ISIS built a network of likeminded non-state actors around the 
globe. Within months of declaring the caliphate, other non-state actors began 
to pledge the baya, an oath of allegiance to the Islamic State and Baghdadi as 
its caliph. Within its first year, Boko Haram in Nigeria pledged allegiance to 
33Caris and Reynolds 2014, 4.
34Caris and Reynolds 2014, 5.
35Irving 2018; McCants 2015, 135–139; Kilcullen 2016, 94–95.
36Barrett 2017.
37Williams 2017, 276–281. For other fighters with no direct connection to ISIS, see 
Kilcullen 2016, 112–117.
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the caliphate, as did Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines, leaders from the 
Haqqani network in Pakistan and Afghanistan, insurgents in the Sinai Penin-
sula in Egypt, and Islamist groups in Libya. ISIS, in other words, transformed 
from an Arab, Middle Eastern phenomenon into a truly global, transnational, 
super networked non-state actor.38 Groups that pledged the baya to ISIS have 
persisted and continue to identify with it despite the decline of the Islamic 
State, including in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. Despite being militarily confronted in the Philippines and in Libya, ISIS 
affiliate groups have reemerged in both countries.39
The Coalition’s Response to ISIS
The rise of ISIS and the creation of the Islamic State prompted an international 
response aimed at eradicating this threat. In September 2014, a multinational 
coalition of 73 countries and four transnational organizations formed the 
“global coalition against Daesh [ISIS],” with the express intent of “degrad-
ing and ultimately defeating Daesh.”40 Four “pillars” govern the coalition: 1) 
to be a mechanism for state mobilization; 2) to work “by, with and through 
partners to help states solve their problems with Daesh”; 3) to be a voluntary 
organization; 4) and to recognize that no single strategy will eradicate Daesh 
and that a “tailored” approach is needed.41
First, the multinational response to ISIS has focused heavily on the use of 
military force to diminish ISIS’s capabilities in Iraq and Syria, and to degrade 
its affiliates around the globe. In October 2014, the U.S. government named 
its counter-ISIS mission Operation Inherent Resolve, and its objective was 
to degrade ISIS’s capabilities, largely through an air campaign, and to train, 
advise, and assist Iraqi and Syrian troops to fight ISIS on the ground. Together 
with British, French, Dutch, Australian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, Emirati, 
and Turkish forces and (to an extent) Russian forces, which are not part of 
the coalition, this combined military effort conducted an estimated 13,315 air 
attacks against ISIS targets in Iraq and 14,660 strikes against targets in Syria. 
These operations have claimed credit for killing tens-of-thousands of ISIS 
fighters, forcing ISIS out of its major cities, denying it territory, and destroying 
its military reserves in addition to other material assets.42
38McCants 2015, 139–142; Kilcullen 2016, 127–132.
39For Libya, see Daragahi 2018; for the Philippines, see Mogato 2017.
40Global Coalition 2018. 
41Global Coalition 2018.
42BBC 2018.
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A similar coalition, composed mostly of Special Operations Forces (SOF), 
has also gone after ISIS affiliates around the globe, combining military strikes 
with missions to train, advise and assist local forces. In these cases, SOF has 
worked closely with host nations and their militaries, often side-by-side, to aid 
these countries and provide capabilities in their fight against ISIS and similar 
militant groups, like Al Qaeda. As a coalition, SOF has operated in Libya, the 
Sahel and Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Philippines.43 In Yemen, Pakistan, 
Somalia, and Afghanistan the United States also has used Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) to target and kill ISIS and Al Qaeda operatives and assets.44 
In Afghanistan, a counter-ISIS mission has become part of the wider continu-
ation of Operation Enduring Freedom, currently in its seventeenth year.45
Second, countries have reacted to ISIS by increasing their homeland 
defense. These measures have run the gamut from increased infrastructure 
protection to restrictions on immigration. In the United States, for example, 
the Trump administration issued a travel ban on seven countries, five Muslim 
majority countries (Iran, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria), citing national 
security as the reason for the executive order.46 The concern over the return 
of ISIS fighters from Iraq and Syria has also alarmed countries. However, as of 
2017, the Soufan Center notes that surprisingly few fighters have returned.47 
Many have chosen neither to stay in Syria and Iraq nor go home but rather 
to go to a third country to fight with ISIS affiliates—particularly in Egypt, 
Libya, Afghanistan, and the Philippines—but also to stay in Syria and Iraq to 
continue the fight. An August 2018 UN report estimated that between 20,000 
and 30,000 foreign fighters remained in Iraq and Syria and will continue to 
fight for the recreation of the caliphate.48
Third, various countries have implemented deradicalization and Coun-
tering Violent Extremism programs (CVE) with the intent of rehabilitating 
individuals who have turned towards religious radicalism, including specific 
groups like ISIS, and programs designed to prevent radicalism from occur-
ring in the first place. These programs have run the gamut from those that 
aim to build critical thinking skills, to ones that provide religious education, 
to programs designed to teach vocational skills aimed at making vulnerable 
43Ryan 2016; Hennigan 2017. 
44Watts et al. 2017, 50–81.
45Burns 2018. 
46Liptak and Shear 2018. 
47Barrett 2017, 9–13.
48Al Jazeera 2018. 
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youth more employable.49 The success of these programs is hard to measure 
and controversial.50 In France, for example, a deradicalization program that 
targeted Muslim immigrants, focused on instilling laïcité (French values) in 
addition to teaching classes on religion, democracy and history as a means of 
socializing at-risk youth. The program was shut down months after it began, 
following protests from local citizens who were afraid that the school would 
bring jihadis to their town.51
Finally, some efforts have focused on populations in areas hardest hit by 
ISIS, such as Iraq and Syria, or countries with ISIS-affiliated non-state actors, 
like Nigeria and the Philippines, but the response has been considerably less 
robust than military operations. First, most of these countries suffer from 
political, social and economic insecurity, along with open conflict and hos-
tilities. Working with these vulnerable populations is difficult because local 
governments often lack the capacity to target at risk areas, and international 
efforts are stifled by insecure environments. Second, much of the counter-ISIS 
work has focused on fighting the non-state actor militarily and measuring 
success by territory retaken, fighters killed, and resources destroyed, rather 
than working with vulnerable populations. Third, working with vulnerable 
populations is harder to do, takes longer and is it is more difficult to measure 
progress. Despite this, groups like the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), the U.S. government’s arm for overseas development, has 
made countering violent extremism one of its priorities and addresses “drivers 
of violent extremism in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia” through various 
forms of development.52
The Wider Muslim Population
Trapped in the middle between religiously motivated non-state actors claiming 
to fight for divine justice on their behalf and governments aiming to under-
mine ISIS, is the wider Muslim ummah, or worldwide Muslim community. 
Both ISIS and coalition powers challenging the non-state actor claim to be 
fighting on behalf of the population and to have its best interests at heart. 
However, several indicators suggest that the population, while disdainful 
of ISIS, is also suspicious of powers claiming to fight the non-state actor on 
their behalf.
49Johnson 2018.
50Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin 2011. 
51Crowell 2017. 
52Denoeux and Carter 2009. 
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Most specifically, although polling data on Muslim attitudes towards 
ISIS is thin, a 2015 Pew survey on the subject is telling. This poll found that, 
in ten Muslim majority countries surveyed,53 respondents “overwhelmingly 
expressed negative views of ISIS.”54 The report notes that, “[s]ix-in-ten or 
more had unfavorable opinions of ISIS in a diverse group of nations, includ-
ing Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Malaysia and Senegal.” Lebanon 
had a near universal condemnation of the group. Perhaps of concern, notable 
numbers of respondents in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mayasia, and Senegal did 
not know what to think of ISIS (20, 28, 25, and 29 percent respectively), and 
in Pakistan that number was 62 percent.55 But even these statistics suggest 
that the majority of people in these countries do not overtly support ISIS.
A 2017 Zogby poll of ten Muslim majority countries had similar findings.56 
The survey focused on a variety of questions posed to millennials about their 
faith and identity. When asked about the Islamic nature of extremist groups 
like Al Qaeda and ISIS, the overwhelming majority said these groups were 
completely wrong. The report notes, however, that, “[i]n Lebanon, four in 
10, have ambivalent views on extremist groups while in Oman it is 37%.” 
The report surmises, “[y]oung Arabs who believe that there can be some, 
partial correctness to these groups will be susceptible and vulnerable to their 
messaging and influence. This vulnerability is sure to be a greater test for the 
Muslim community in the long term than the continued physical presence of 
extremist groups in current conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.”57 When asked 
why individuals join extremist groups, the top reason cited in eight countries 
was “a conviction that these groups represent truth,”58 followed by “extreme 
religious discourse and teachings,” then “poor levels of education” followed by 
economic conditions and state oppression.59 Thus, Muslims across the ummah 
appear to be deeply suspicious and condemning of ISIS but do express some 
views that may make them vulnerable to extremism.
However, polling data also suggest that average Muslims are deeply 
suspicious of western powers, especially the United States, and their foreign 
53Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Palestinian territories, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Pakistan and Malaysia.
54Poushter 2015. 
55Poushter 2015.
56Yunas et al. 2017. The countries are Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Sudan, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Oman, Yemen and Qatar.
57Yunas et al. 2017, 27. 
58Yunas et al. 2017, 28. The countries are Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Mauritania, 
Yemen, Oman, and Iraq.
59Yunas et al. 2017, 28.
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policies. Beginning in 2002, the Pew Foundation began surveying countries 
around the world on attitudes towards the United States. Polling data from 
key Muslim countries, particularly those in the Middle East, have revealed 
chronically low opinions towards the United States. For example, the 2015 
polling data showed that, of the countries surveyed worldwide, the United 
States is the least popular with Jordanians, Turks, Lebanese, Palestinians, and 
Pakistanis. Jordanians registered only 14 percent favorability rating towards 
the United States, the lowest of all countries surveyed.60 A 2017 Pew poll found 
that the majority surveyed in five Middle Eastern and North African countries 
(Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Turkey, Tunisia) saw the United States as playing a 
bigger role in the region than it did ten years ago, and only 27 percent viewed 
the United States favorably.61
It is well understood that the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
had negative consequences, particularly in regards to inspiring and justifying 
non-state actor violence. These wars have become powerful points of valida-
tion for religious terrorists who claim these are examples of U.S. intentions to 
destroy Islam.62 The war in Iraq also inadvertently paved the way for the rise 
of ISIS through the power vacuum it created with the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein, the disenfranchisement of the Sunni population, and the insurgent 
groups the occupation inspired. Popular rumors that the United States created 
ISIS to destroy Iraq and Muslim countries is, more broadly, further evidence 
that average Muslims are deeply suspicious of the United States, its foreign 
policy actions, and its motivations.63 These rumors spread beyond just the 
Middle East and included Muslims in Southeast Asia.64
Also noteworthy, polling data suggest that Muslims want religion in the 
public sphere, and want greater inclusion of shariah law in their countries. A 
2013 Pew survey found that, of the countries polled, “overwhelming percent-
ages of Muslims in many countries want Islamic law (sharia) to be the official 
law of the land.”65 However, it is unclear if most understand shariah in terms 
of family law, criminal law, or both. These findings suggest that many Mus-
lims may be moving towards a more fundamentalist mind set, one in which 
secular politics and society are not the desired goals. The 2017 Zogby poll 
60Wike, Stokes, and Poushter 2015, 12. 
61Fetterolf and Poushter 2017. 
62Al Qaeda especially named U.S. foreign policy as one of the main reasons for taking 
violent action. See Bin Laden 1996 and Bin Laden 2004. 
63Kirpatrick 2014. 
64Author’s conversations with Indonesians in 2016.
65Bell 2013, 15. 
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of millennial Muslims surveyed found that respondents in all ten countries 
named “living by Islamic ethics and morals” the most important part of their 
faith, and that, if “cultural content breaches the moral and ethical values of 
society, it should be banned.”66
While more polling needs to be done to better understand Muslim per-
ceptions across the ummah and with specific communities that have been 
directly affected by ISIS, these brief findings suggest that, of the countries 
surveyed, Muslims are condemning of ISIS, but also want religion regulating 
aspects of public life. Furthermore, they are deeply fearful of western powers, 
particularly the United States, and their policies towards the Muslim world.
Conclusion
This net assessment of ISIS, governments fighting ISIS, and the wider Muslim 
population yields the following observations.
Coalition forces have had considerable success using military force to deny 
ISIS territory in Syria and Iraq, in addition to killing tens-of-thousands of its 
fighters and destroying its resources. The destruction of the Islamic State raises 
important questions for what ISIS’s next move may be. There is evidence to 
suggest that ISIS will fight for the recreation of the caliphate, which requires 
“power, authority and control of territory.”67 The fact that Al Baghdadi has not 
admitted to the defeat of the Islamic State, along with the continued presence 
of an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, suggest 
that the desire to recreate the caliphate is still alive in the minds of many of its 
foreign fighters.68 The caliphate outside of Iraq and Syria may also be a pos-
sibility. Several ISIS affiliates have attempted to hold territory, including ISIS 
in the Philippines, which captured and held the city of Marawi in Mindanao 
for five months in 2017 before the Philippine military drove it out. In Nigeria, 
Boko Haram held territory the size of Belgium before a multinational task 
force of regional militaries and international advisors took back the territory. 
ISIS affiliates also have held and lost territory in Libya and Afghanistan.69 All 
of these locations could have been potential places to relocate the caliphate, 
but the denial of territory has precluded it. If coalition forces continue to deny 
ISIS territory to establish the caliphate, ISIS will need to reinvent its grand 
66Yunas et al. 2017, 13–14. 
67McCants 2015, 116.
68Al Jazeera 2018. 
69For the Philippines, see Postings 2017; for Boko Haram, see Blair 2015; for Libya, 
see Daragahi 2018; For Afghanistan, see Stars and Stripes 2018.
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strategy because its current vision, both in terms of unifying and purifying 
the ummah and its apocalyptic aims, are utterly dependent on it.
Second, in addition to going after the caliphate, efforts to target the leader 
of ISIS, al Baghdadi, may also force the non-state actor to drastically change 
its ideology and raison d’être. Al Baghdadi has unique attributes that will not 
be easy to duplicate, including blood ties to the Prophet Muhammed’s tribe, 
extensive religious education, bona fides as both an insurgent and a religious 
leader, and recognition by his followers as the caliph. While certainly other 
leaders can rise to manage ISIS as a non-state actor, none will be able to du-
plicate the blood and religious traits necessary to be the rightly guided caliph. 
Therefore, successfully removing Al Baghdadi from the battlefield may have 
significant consequences for ISIS’ grand scenario of creating the caliphate, 
unifying and purifying the ummah, and hastening the end of times.
Third, despite the de facto loss of the caliphate, ISIS persists as a non-state 
actor and likeminded groups continue to claim allegiance to it. ISIS affili-
ates persist in North Africa, the Sinai Peninsula, Southeast Asia, the Sahel, 
the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and along the Afghan-Pakistani 
border despite concerted efforts from coalition SOF and local governments to 
target these groups and deny them territory. A key point to monitor moving 
forward is why groups continue to affiliate with ISIS despite its diminished 
status, and what benefits these groups gain from this alliance. Working to 
undermine “perks” that come with the ISIS brand is important for diminish-
ing its appeal with affiliates.
Fourth, the anticipation of foreign fighters returning from the battlefield 
to wreak havoc on the homeland appears, so far, to be unfounded. Rather, the 
ISIS threat to the homeland has come from citizens that have been inspired, 
not trained, by ISIS. A 2017 Soufan Center report quotes Thomas Hegg-
hammer, whose analysis finds that, “in the first year of the Caliphate there 
were ‘over twice as many IS sympathizer plots (22) as plots involving foreign 
fighters.”70 An August 2018 statement by Al Baghdadi called for continued 
attacks against infidels by sympathetic Muslims around the globe: “A bullet 
fired, stabbing, detonation of an IED in your countries are tantamount to a 
thousand attacks here in [Syria and Iraq], and don’t neglect the ramming at-
tacks on the road.”71 Efforts to defend the homeland from ISIS terrorist acts, 
therefore, is still important and relevant, but requires the difficult task of 
discerning which citizens may be a threat to their own population. In these 
countries, governments should work to build better relationships with their 
70Barrett 2017, 15.
71Al Baghdadi 2018, 6.
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own Muslim populations. They are, in most cases, the first line of defense 
against domestic sympathizers to ISIS.
Finally, coalition powers have devoted the least amount of time and ef-
fort towards understanding critical Muslim populations and winning them 
away from ISIS. Ultimately, ISIS cannot persist without the support of key 
demographics, specifically local populations in which ISIS operates, foreign 
supporters, and the wider Muslim community. Most critically, coalition pow-
ers need to engage local populations where ISIS operates or has operated. In 
Syria, the population has suffered ineffably through war and violent conflict. 
Unfortunately, these populations remain largely out of reach of international 
organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the Assad 
regime either ignores or persecute these citizens. Helping vulnerable popula-
tions in Syria, therefore, will continue to be a challenge moving forward. In 
Iraq, the international community has more opportunities to engage popu-
lations. Ultimately, anti-ISIS coalition powers should encourage the newly 
formed Iraqi government to engage local Sunni populations and ensure that 
they are part of the political process and protected from retaliatory attacks. This 
is not an easy sell for the Shia-dominated government but coalition powers 
should provide incentives for the Iraqi government to be more inclusive of its 
Sunni minority. In the end, the destruction of the Islamic State in Syrian and 
Iraq was only phase one of the overall war to defeat the ISIS phenomenon, 
which includes affiliates around the globe.
In countries with ISIS affiliates, similar efforts to engage at-risk popula-
tions are important for undermining these non-state actors. Military action 
alone is unlikely to eradicate the problem. In Mindanao, for example, Phil-
ippine forces succeeded in routing ISIS fighters from Marawi, but not after 
literally destroying the entire city. The population there, which is almost 
entirely Muslim, is vulnerable to further radicalization given this enormous 
disruption to their lives.72 In Nigeria, the fight against Boko Haram has cre-
ated an estimated 110,000 refugees, and 87,600 have registered with UNHCR 
in Cameroon alone. The Cameroonian government is forcibly repatriating 
some refugees, but without security and other necessities, this population 
also remains vulnerable to extremism.73
Finally, the anti-ISIS coalition should do more to harness the popular 
distain for ISIS in the Muslim world. As the polling data suggest, the over-
whelming majority of the ummah sees ISIS as illegitimate and a perversion of 
Islam. However, it also appears that the majority of the ummah is not taking 
72Postings 2017. 
73Mbiyozo 2018. 
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action to disagree with or undermine ISIS’s appeal to a small but influential 
minority. Countering ISIS requires more than not supporting it, it also re-
quires actively disagreeing with its message and providing a better one in its 
place. Muslim youth from across the ummah should work to actively reject 
and discredit ISIS’s message, sending a clear statement that it does not speak 
for their faith.
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